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Abstract: 
 
Psychological constructs often are incorporated into treatments before they are investigated 
systematically from a basic‐science perspective. We discuss the potential costs of such a 
sequence of events and the potential benefits of closer working ties between basic and clinical 
scientists, and we consider how applying basic knowledge of cognitive processes could enhance 
our understanding of psychotherapy outcome and mechanisms of action. We call upon clinical 
and basic scientists to engage in a more “mindful” enterprise of translational research. 
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Article: 
 
Publication of the article by Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Carlson, and Anderson (this issue) proposing 
an operational definition of mindfulness provides an opportunity to observe how basic behavioral 
science and clinical science influence—or fail to influence—each other. The concept of 
mindfulness has been incorporated into psychological treatments despite the absence of a robust 
scientific understanding of the phenomenon itself. Along with the proposed operational 
definition, Bishop and colleagues present a thoughtful analysis of the nature of mindfulness and 
preliminary hypotheses regarding how the underlying psychological processes, the skills 
themselves, and the consequences of skill acquisition might be measured. The article represents a 
potentially important milestone for psychotherapy research, but it also illustrates a frequent 
paradox of psychotherapy research: pursuing the basic science after a treatment or technique has 
been disseminated. 
 
In this commentary, we discuss some potential costs of this clinic‐first scenario as well as the 
potential benefits of a more deliberate translational strategy. We then illustrate how basic and 
clinical science might work more synergistically by considering the challenges facing 
researchers who study possible mechanisms of action underlying therapeutic interventions. 
 
There are numerous examples of psychological treatment strategies or techniques becoming 
popularized before the underlying principle or phenomenon is understood (Moras, 
2002; Salkovskis, 2002). We believe that such examples outnumber cases in which strategies or 
techniques emerged or “crossed over” from basic science. For instance, both cognitive therapy 
(CT; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and interpersonal therapy (IPT; Klerman, Weissman, 
Rounsaville, & Chevron, 1984) were designed and implemented as interventions for depression 
in the absence of a clear empirical basis in behavioral science. It was after those treatments 
became established that a corpus of basic research examining the psychological phenomena 
underlying each treatment emerged (particularly for CT). Mindfulness is the latest example of 
this trend for intervention development to precede basic science. We believe it is important to 
identify the potential costs of incorporating constructs that lack a basic‐science foundation into 
treatments as well as the potential benefits of a more deliberate, mindful strategy in which basic 
research either precedes or accompanies clinical application of new constructs. 
 
THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF PROCEEDING WITHOUT BASIC SCIENCE 
 
The field of psychotherapy research has progressed beyond the question of whether psychosocial 
interventions can be effective to grapple with more complex questions such as what makes a 
particular intervention work (Beutler, Moleiro, & Talebi, 2002). In particular, both researchers 
and clinicians seek to determine which intervention(s) will be most effective for a particular 
individual with specific problems (Beutler & Harwood, 2000). However, without a thorough 
understanding of the interventions that therapists might use, it will not be possible to predict with 
appropriate accuracy and reliability which would be best for a given patient. There are critical 
questions about a given clinical technique or intervention approach that cannot be answered 
without basic science data. Is it really what we think it is (construct validity)? How can it be 
measured? What individual difference and/or situational variables predict its onset, maintenance, 
and disappearance? Under what circumstances is it most, or least, effective? 
 
But given the long history of mindfulness‐based techniques, wouldn't it be unrealistic to expect 
clinicians to forego their use until psychologists had determined exactly what mindfulness was? 
Our reply is as follows. It would indeed be unrealistic and unwise for clinicians not to consider 
using mindfulness techniques as long as their clinical practice was scientifically grounded—that 
is, as long as clinicians recognized their work as applied behavioral science and understood the 
distinction between empirically supported aspects of psychotherapy (techniques as well as 
relationships) and not‐well‐understood interventions (McFall, 2000). A scientifically grounded 
approach to psychotherapy would encourage clinicians both to return to the basic science 
literature for ways to conceptualize the techniques they seek to use, and to contribute to the 
development of basic knowledge as they learn about concepts of interest through their clinical 
practice. 
 
THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TRANSLATIONAL APPROACHES 
 
A recent National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; 1999) task force report observed that 
interventions in mental health seldom incorporate knowledge and methods developed from basic 
behavioral science. The report noted that “behavioral science offers critical insights into the 
nature of mental illness and mental health, and the processes and interventions that can prevent 
illness or lead from disorder to remission, recovery, and rehabilitation” (p. 13). Although 
collaborations between basic and clinical scientists remain infrequent, the benefits of such 
collaborations are clear. We briefly note just three: 
 
Availability of data regarding phenomena of interest: The likelihood that an important 
phenomenon or treatment process already has been observed (at least in analog form) and 
described systematically is great (Strauman, 1995). 
 
Measurement techniques: The likelihood that an instrument or method already exists that can 
provide reliable assessment of the phenomenon or process of interest also is great. 
 
Theoretical basis for hypotheses regarding mechanisms of action: Conceptual models of the 
phenomenon of interest provide a logically and empirically sound basis for developing 
hypotheses about how, and under what circumstances, an intervention might work. 
 
BASIC SCIENCE AND CLINICAL SCIENCE IN PARTNERSHIP: STUDYING 
COGNITIVE CHANGE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
The benefits of a translational approach warrant further discussion. Consider how techniques 
such as mindfulness relate to basic knowledge regarding cognition and cognitive change, and 
how a focus on developing treatment interventions provides the opportunity to move toward a 
merging of basic science and clinical science. Psychotherapy research has become increasingly 
focused on determining mechanisms of action (Persons & Miranda, 1995) and how those 
mechanisms relate to recovery and relapse prevention. The mindfulness article draws attention to 
one potentially important factor concerning underlying mechanisms: the concept of skill 
acquisition (particularly cognitive or metacognitive skills) and its role in therapeutic change. 
 
Bishop et al. proposed that mindfulness is best conceptualized as a skill acquired through 
instruction and practice. This conceptualization can provide a foundation for exploring basic 
questions about treatment‐related change. For example, one might ask whether the cognitive 
processes underlying mindfulness, taught in the context of affect management, are fundamentally 
different from cognitive processes involved in affect management in nonpatient controls who 
have not been taught mindfulness. Skill‐based change may involve the engagement (or even 
formation) of entirely new cognitive systems not seen in nonpatient controls or in patients treated 
with other approaches (e.g., pharmacotherapy). There is growing evidence that the cognitive 
changes that take place during therapy are associated with changes in basic neurobiology, such 
as in synaptic plasticity (see Liggan & Kay, 1999, for a review). 
 
Integrating basic research on information processing and the neural underpinnings of cognition 
with clinical research on psychopathology and processes of change has much to offer. One such 
potential contribution is with regard to measurement of cognitive change in therapy. Clinical 
researchers often rely on self‐report instruments with high face validity (e.g., the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire [Hollon & Kendall, 1980] used to assess changes in negative thinking). 
However, such instruments cannot measure underlying cognitive processes. Without more 
specific, targeted measures, the distinction proposed by Bishop et al. between the cognitive 
processes underlying mindfulness and the products of those processes is unlikely to be clinically 
or scientifically meaningful. There are many possible information processing “pathways” leading 
to the same skill‐acquisition outcome. 
 
Assuming that symptomatic improvement is correlated with skill acquisition, how can we be sure 
that the improvement observed has resulted from that skill? Changes in end‐product measures 
alone may suggest that a shift in underlying cognitive organization has taken place, but the 
specific nature of the underlying change will remain elusive. However, by developing and testing 
hypotheses about the basic processes likely to be modified by skill acquisition (e.g., episodic 
memory), the neurobiological correlates of those processes, or both, the possibility of a 
significant advancement of both basic and clinical science increases. 
 
It is here that psychotherapy researchers are most likely to benefit from integrating concepts and 
measures from behavioral science. Research in basic and social cognition offers a range of 
methods to investigate how information processing influences mood and motivation. 
Technological advances such as functional neuro‐imaging may allow researchers to learn more 
about the cognitive and neurobiological processes associated with psychopathology and how 
treatment influences them. Conversely, the challenge of extending basic‐science theories and 
methods to study rich, complex phenomena such as mindfulness is just as likely to benefit our 
fundamental understanding of cognition. 
 
How can we study therapy‐related skill acquisition and cognitive change in a more meaningful 
and informative way? Bishop et al. remind us that we must first operationalize the therapeutic 
strategies hypothesized to be “active ingredients” in the change process, which itself is a major 
challenge in light of the ambiguities surrounding studies of putative therapeutic mechanisms of 
action (Messer & Wampold, 2002). But in order to establish clear causal links between 
nterventions and outcomes, operationalizations of intervention techniques must be rooted in a 
solid theoretical and empirical foundation. Interventions that lack such a foundation (e.g., 
EMDR; for a critique, see Lohr, Lilienfeld, Tolin, & Herbert, 1999) force clinical researchers to 
work backwards and, in the absence of any guiding theory, generate posthoc speculations 
regarding possible active components. Unfortunately, such work often takes place long after the 
intervention has been popularized and the opportunity for high‐impact translational research has 
been lost. 
 
Once putative “active ingredients” have been identified and operationalized, how can it be 
determined whether changes in psychological processes of interest have occurred? It is not 
possible to rely on self‐reports of changes in cognitive or metacognitive processes that may or 
may not be accessible for conscious evaluation. This apparent obstacle actually represents an 
important opportunity for the field, because it forces us to conceptualize change processes in 
basic‐science terms. Cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience offer a plethora of useful 
data and theory regarding learning, memory, information processing, and neural systems. In this 
regard, we appreciate the suggestions offered by Bishop et al. regarding how mindfulness and 
related skill acquisition might be assessed, using experimental tasks that tap into basic cognitive 
processes (e.g., the emotional Stroop task). 
 
Finally, the translational approach is applicable not only to treatment development but also to 
studies of treatment process and outcome. Outcome research could examine both whether 
therapy‐based skill acquisition leads to changes in fundamental cognitive processes and whether 
such changes moderate clinical improvement. Although the question of symptom relief is 
undoubtedly an important one, questions regarding how and why a treatment works ultimately 
will be more valuable in improving efficacy, predicting outcome, and preventing relapse. 
 
In summary, the article by Bishop et al. is a welcome effort to link clinical intervention more 
thoroughly with basic science, albeit after the popularization of mindful‐ness‐based techniques. 
We urge clinical investigators to take a mindfully translational approach in which clinical 
scientists develop and validate interventions by linking them with basic behavioral science. 
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